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VA- ~fJI 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
·Record No. 2046 
A. A. HOOFF AND ANNIE B. BROWN, TRADING AS 
BROWN AND HOOFF, Plaintiffs in Error, 
versus 
FRANKLIN PAINE AND HELEN PAINE, Defendants in 
Error. 
To the Honorable, the J~tstices of the Supreme Cowrt o.f .Ap-
peals of Vi1·ginia: 
Your petitioners, A. A. Hooff and Annie B. Brown, trading 
as Brown and Hooff, respectfully represent that they are 
aggrieved by a judgment of the Circuit Court of Fairfax 
County, rendered against them April 8, 1938, in a pro-
ceeding at law, by way of 1notion for judgnwnt, in which they 
were plaintiffs, and Franklin Paine aud Jielen Paine were de- · 
fendants, of which the record is hereto annexed. (Such judg-
ment was final.) 
STATE1\1:ENT OF CASE. 
Plaintiffs filed their notice of motion to recover of the de-
fendants, $885.20, with interest from October 16, 1937, on u 
negotiable, promissory note, for the principal sum of $769.74, · 
with interest and 15% attorney's fees, executed by defendants 
to plaintiffs, by the trade name of plaintiffs (Brown and 
Hooff), dated August 17, 1937 (R., p. 2). The defendants 
each filed a plea of nil debit. (R., pp. 3-4). The court tried 
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the issue on the general replication to these pleas, without a 
jury, and rendered judgment for the defendants (R., p. 5). 
The record is short; the evidence is brief (R., pp. 6-10), 
and the issue is narrow. 
The precise question is : Are the makers of a negotiable, 
promissory note, which recited that it was given for value, 
executed by defendants to plaintiffs, who furnished building 
materials to defendants' general contractor, to cover the value 
of such materials, pursuant to an agreement that plaintiffs 
would not file a mechanic's lien if such note were given, and 
defendants were to have the right of renewal and extension 
to cover a period of thirty~two months, liable on such note, 
when. the general contractor afterwards abandoned his con-
tract, and after the owners had completed the work, there was 
nothing due the general contractor~ 
The trial Court thought there was no liability; and held that 
the 'vritten promise was unenforceable (R., p. 10). 
The plaintiffs, to maintain the issue on their part, iiltroduced 
the negotiable, promissory note sued on (which had been en-
dorsed by them), and rested (R., pp. 6-7). 
The defendant, Franldin Payne, testified for the defendants . 
. Except for the letters ,identified by him, there was no other 
evidence in the case. 
Paine (R., pp. 7-10) said he "was a graduate lawyer, em-
ployed in one of the Government Departments as a la'v clerk. 
Th&t the plaintiffs were not lawyers, but material -men". 
And that :.1\-Ir. Hooff was the only member of the firm with 
whom defendants had any dealings (R., p. 9). 
He said that July 15, 1937, ·A. A. Hooff, of plaintiffs, came 
to see him with reference to an unpaid bill of $794.74 due 
by McDonald, the general contractor, for materials purchased 
by McDonald of plaintiffs to go into a house McDonald was 
building for defendants by contract. That at that time de-
fendants were due l\icDonald about $289.00, to be paid when 
McDonald completed the furnace job. That Hooff told de-
fendants his :firm would file a mechanic's lien, and the wit-
ness told him he did not 'vish a lien :filed; and thereafter, 
August 4th (nearly three weeks after the conversation re-
ferred to), the defendants wrote plaintiffs the letter which 
appears on page 7. 
The letter speaks for itself. Briefly, the writers refer to 
the said indebtedness of $794.74 due plaintiffs, and a desire 
to prevent the filing of a lien, and proceed to '' agTee'' to 
execute a note for the amount due, payable in thirty days, 
to pay not less than $25~00 when due, and in consideration of 
this payment the payees will extend the balance on like terms, 
A. A. Hooff & A. B. Brown, etc v. F. Paine & H. Paine. 3 
etc., with the further agreement to execute a second mortgage, 
if required. The plaintiffs accepted the offer, and accepted 
the note, but did not require the mortgage. 
The witness also said that 1\f.cDonald failed to con1plete the 
work. That at the time of the conversation July 15, he showed 
· Hooff the job, and told hin1 certain work was yet to be co1n4 
pleted, and that when it was con1pleted, he would owe him 
about $289.00. That it cost over $289.00 to complete it. . 
While Paine said he told I-Iooff he would owe 1fcDonald 
about $289.00, to be paid when the job was completed, and. 
testified that when the notes were executed (about three weeks 
after the conversation), he owed ~IcDonald nothing, he does 
not pretend that he told Hooff that he owed ~fcDonald noth-
ing, or that he told Hooff that it would cost "about $289.00" 
to complete tJ1e job. These were all 1natters of fact with 
which the defendants were far more familiar than the plain-
tiffs; and none of thmn were brought home to the plaintiffs or 
either of them when the defendants offered to give the note 
and mortgage, and when they did execute the note, which was 
accepted by the plaintiffs. 
The witness Paine also testified that Hooff told him he 
would file a mechanic's lien, and defendant would have to pay 
the bill, a.nd he thought that he would be required under the 
law to pay the bill. 
All of this alleged conversation between Paine and Hooff 
was July 15, 1937. 
After nearly three weeks in which to consider the n1atter, 
with much fuller knowledge of the facts that either of the 
plaintiffs possessed, and certainly with equal opportunities 
of advising themselves on the law in the premises, these 
defendants, one of whom is a graduate lawyer, mnployed as 
a Government law clerk, with access to the most con1plete Jaw 
library in the country, and, as the sequel shows, with access 
to able and learned ·virginia counsel, wrote the plaintiffs, the 
letter appearing on R., page 7, referred to. 
The note was executed, aceepted, and apparently discounted, 
as it is endorsed (R., p. 6). Tho second n1ortgage was not re-· 
quired by the plaintiffs. 
August 26, 1937, the defendant, Franklin (R.) Paine, wrote 
a letter repudiating· the obligation of the note. In this letter, 
the co-defendant, Helen Paine, did not unite. 
The evidence is silent on the question 'vhether the plaintiffs, 
as sub-contractors, had taken any steps to make the owners 
liable under Sec. 6429a, Code, prior to July 15, 1937. In the 
view of plaintiffs this is no longer relevant. 
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THE LAW. 
Plaintiffs think that the trial Court misapprehended the 
scope and meaning of the opinion ~of this Court in Southside 
Brick Works v. Anderson, 147 Va. 566. 
There the Court was dealing with an oral promise,-not, 
as in the instant case, with a written promise. That case 
·turned solely on the question whether an oral promise to pay 
the material man (sub-contractor) could be enforced when 
the owner owed the g·eneral contractor nothing. 
The Court says : ''The basis for the claim against the 
owner is the contention t~1at in order to prevent the plain-
tiff, as a material man, from filing a lien for the price of 
the bricks against the building then under construction, she 
agreed orally to pay the bill. 
''At the trial the jury were instructed that the plaintiff 
could not recover upon the oral promise, and instructions 
offered for the plaintiff, submitting to the jury the question 
whether or not the owner 'vas liable ~pon such promise, ·were 
refused. So that the qnestion 'is as to whether 'ltnder the 
ci'l·c'ltmstances of th,is case, in order to su,stain a. recovery, the 
pro1nise sho'ltld have bemt in 1v1·iting." 
''A brief reference to the surrounding circumstances is 
necessary in order to determine whether the particular 
promise is void as "rithin the statute of frauds because not in 
writing." (Italics supplied.) 
Thus it clearly appears that the contract, or promise, was 
rejected solely becausP. it was not in writing; and that it was 
the statute of frauds which 1nade this oral promise non-
enforceable. 
The statement of the Court, "So that the question is as to 
whether, under the cire.umstances of this case, in. order to 
sustain a recovery, t.he promise should haye been in writing", 
is utterly without meaning, unless it means that had the 
promise been in writing recovery would have been sustained. 
(In that case the owner claimed she owed the general con-
tractor nothing; that he abandoned the work; and that she 
made -a verbal promise to pay the material ma.n), to prevent 
the filing of a lien.) 
Why should the Court have found it necessary to review 
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the surrounding circun1stances to determine \vhether the 
promise wa,s void, as within the statute of frauds because not 
in writing, if the promise would have been equally void had 
it been in \Vriting~ 
The major portion of the opinion is devoted to a discussion 
of the distinction between oral contracts, which, when en-
forceable, are original contracts, made for the purpose of 
securing the completion of the building; and those contracts 
which are not founded on such consideration, and to be en-
forceable, 1nust be in ;writing. That case so fully supports 
the views of the plaintiffs, and is so replete with arguments, 
illustrations and authorities, that a selection of portions of 
the opinion is difficult. 
In a quotation from 1 vVilliston on Contracts, Sec. 452 (on 
page 573) is found this question and answer (having reference 
to the requiren1ent that the prmnise must be written) : "V'7hy 
should such pron1ises, n1ore than others, be subject to that re-
quirement 1 Doubtless because the prmnisor has received no 
benefit from the transaction.'' This as to written promises. 
But as to oral promises, the wTiter has this to say: " * * >K• 
It is not a mere technicality to require, as the fundamental 
elen1ent in a valid oral l)l'Ornise to discharg·e another's 
liability, the receipt by the promisor of a qu·id p1·o qttw, or 
beneficial consideration.'' (Italics supplied.) 
If the vie,vs of plaintiffs are not correct, then nearly the 
entire opinion in lVay v. Bayd'ltst, 133 Va. 400, as \Veil as much 
that is said in the numerous supporting opinions is irrelevant. 
In these cases, the Court very sharply drew the distinction 
between oral pr01nises, which are not within the statute of 
frauds, if prmnises as an original undertaking, and pro1nises 
within the statute, as prmnises to answer for the debt, default 
or misdoing of another. The entire issue in those cases \Vas 
whether the promise was such as the statute requires to be in 
writing. 
Plaintiffs are unable to see why in any case a promise must 
be in writing, if, as clain1ed by the defendants, and apparently 
held hy the trial Court, the promisee has to make out the same 
sort of case when the promise is in writing, as when the 
pron1ise is oral. 
Skinner v. Annstrong, 86 Va. 1011, 1015, is direetly in point. 
Referring to the statute of frauds, the Court says on page 
1015: "That statute contemplates a grautitous verbal promise 
by one to pay the debt 'vhich he does not owe, a.nd is not 
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liable for, but which is owed by anotl1er; and ~he· intent an? 
purpose of the statute is to compel the reduction to the eVI-
dence of writing of such voluntary promise, for the protection, 
alike, of pro1nisor and pro,rnisee from fraud by reason of the 
uncertainty of any demand on such contract without con-
sideration.'' 
"The reduction to the evidence of writing of such 'volun-
tary promise'." \Vha.t "Voluntary pron1ise "? "A gratuitous 
verbal promise" by one to pay the debt which he does not 
owe, and is not liable for, but which is owed by another. 
This is the defense or claim of the defendants : That there 
was a written pron1ise to pay a debt 'vhich they claim they 
did not owe, and for which they were not liable, but which 
was owed by another; and although the promise is in writing, 
and the tern1s of the pron1ise are as definite and specific as 
were ever the terms of a proinise, they say this promise is not 
enforceable. 
If defendants' position is correct, then the statute of frauds, 
requiring the pron1ise to answer for the debt, etc., of another, 
to be in writing is without practical meaning, since, in their 
vie,v, even if the promise is in writing, the prmnisee must 
prove a new and independent undertaking, with a considera-
tion moving from the pron1isee to the promisor ,-in which 
event, a verbal pron1ise is sufficient. As said in Skinner v. 
Annstrong, 86 .Va. 1015, "The promise to pay the debt of 
another is not within the letter of spirit of the statute of 
frauds, where there is a new and original consideration, and 
a novation of the debt'', citing nun1erous authQrities. 
Of course, there tnust be a consideration to support any 
enforceable pron1ise, written or verbal; but the authorities 
hold that the consideration to support the written, promise 
does not of necessity n1ove from the promisee to the promisor; 
whereas, the trial Court held that the same consideration 
moving from the promisee to the promisor is required, as 
though it were prmnisor 's original debt. 
But there was consideration to support defendants' promise 
as an original undertaking. 
The note sued on, being negotiable paper, is deemed tJritna 
facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration, even 
in the hands of the payees; Reid v. Windsor, 111 Va. 825, 
831, citing the statute. 
Among the many things deemed a valuable consideration, 
"postponing a demand or forbearance to enforce it for a time" 
are considerations sufficient to support a contract, as well as 
''compromising a co lora ble claim'', 3 :Niin. Pt. 1, p. 133. 
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''A valuable consideration is g·enerally defined as 'some 
right, interest, p1·ofit or benefit accruing to one p~rty, or 
dOme forbearance, detrin1ent, loss or responsibility, given, suf-
fered or undertaken by the other'. There danger, however, 
of misunderstandil).g this definition. The term 'benefit' does 
not refer necessarily to a money gain arising out of the trans-
action, but has reference to any advantage or benefit slight 
but recognizable at Ia,J;r, derived by the promisor in return 
for his promise. Nor does the term detriment refer to 
any pecuniary loss. Any act done by tho promisee, at the 
request of the prornisor, by which the former sustains any 
loss, trouble or inconvenience, even of the rnost trifling de-
scription, if not utterly worthless in the eye of the law, (Wll-
stitutes a valuable consideration for a promise,'' 1 Elliott 
on Con tracts, pp. 337-338. And further : 
"Whether the contract restt; upon a valuable consideration 
o must be determined by the conditions as they exist when it 
is made, not a.s they 1nay be at some subsequent time·,'' pp. 
338-338. 
Defendants say in their letter of August 4 (R., p. 7) they 
are inforn1ed that the general contractor owes plaintiffs 
$794.74 for materials which went into defendants' home; 
and desi.ring to prevent the filing of a lien, they offer to execute 
notes with renewals and extensions ; and they did execute the 
note. "\Vhether they thought that the filing- of a lien ·would 
deter the general contractor from completing the work; 
whether they thought they were liable for the debt; whether 
they desired to avoid the annoyance and costs incident to ihe 
filing of a lien; whethe:J; they expected to ·work it out of the 
general contrac.tor; or whatever n1ay have been their reasons, 
the 1natter must be tested by conditions as they existed when 
the pron1ise 'vas n1ade, and not as they afterwards developed. 
The same author (Elliott) states, p. 403: .·"An agreement 
to withhold suit either nt law or in equity is a sufficient con-
sideration to support a promise, although no fixed and definite 
thne is expressly agreed upon.'' 
One of the most recent and clarifying expositions of this 
subject of "consideration" is found in Looney v. BelchP.r, 
192 · S. E. 891, where it is said on page 893: 
''Any act done at the defendant's request, and for his con-
venience, or to the inconvenience of the plaintiff, would be suffi-
cient.'' 
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In the instant case, the act done (forbearance) was done 
at the defendants' request and for their convenience. 
To quote again fron1 Looney v. Belcher: "Consideration 
n1eans, not so much tha.t one is pro:fiting1 as that the other 
abandons so1ne legal right in the present. Pollock on Con-
tracts, p. 176." 
'' 'Nor need the agreement to delay be for a time certain, 
for it may be for a reasonable time only, and yet be sufficient 
consideration for a promise.' " (In the instant case, the for-
bearance may be said to be for a time certain. $25.00 a month 
to discharge $794.74 would take 32 months, or 2 years and eight 
months. A very material forbearance on the. part of the 
plaintiffs .. ) 
At the time the notes were given, defendants, who knew 
the facts far better than plaintiffs, thought the contractor 
would finish the job; and they thought they would be owjng o 
him money; and if this were true, plaintiffs had a right to 
take statutory steps to secure a lien on this money. But 
defendants did not want a lien, as they 'vrote. So what? 
They made the written prmnise to prevent the lien. 
~Ir. Justice Browning, in the Looney v. Belche1· case, has 
so aptly expressed the views of plaintiffs' counsel, that he 
adopts the language of the Justice as his own: 
''If these elmnents, in their setting, do not constitute con-
sideration-aye, valuable consideration-which will support a 
eontract, then we have n1isconceived the law." 
The defendant, Franklin Paine, testified that he was a 
graduate lawyer, and that 1\Ir. Hooff (the only one of plaintiffs 
with 'vhom they transacted the business) ·was not a lawyer 
(R., p. 9); that July 15, Hooff came to see hhn about the unpaid 
bill of "$794.74 clue by the general contractor for materials 
bought of plaintiffs which went into defendants' home ("ihich 
indebtedness is not disputed), and threatened to :file a lien, 
and said defendant would have to pay the bill, and that the 
witness, a lawyer, thought he would have to pay it. 
But the matter was not clo$ed that day. Nearly three weeks 
elapsed, during ·which time the defendants, who were more 
cognizant of the facts than plaintiffs, had the most abundant 
opportunity of advising themselves of the la'v and consider-
ing what their conclusion would be, and, finally, August 4, 
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this lawyer defendant and his wife wrote the letter referred 
to (R., p. 7) and executed the note or notes. 
There is no pretension that there was any misrepresenta-
tion on the part of the plaintiffs of any iaet, material or other-
wise, nor could there have been any deception, as the defend-
ants knew the facts better than the plaintiffs. 
While a n1istake of law is no g-round for· setting aside a 
compromise; plaintiffs are unwilling to rest under the sus-
picion that they took any sort of advantage of the defend-
ants. .And so they reiterate, they put over no "fast one" 
on an ig'lloranf and unlearned adversary. This graduate law-
yer knew where to find legal counsel quickly enough when the 
general contractor failed to return, aJld \vhen he and his co-
defendant 'vcrc seeking to evade and avoid their written 
promise. (See letter, R., p. 8.) 
But even if the parties were mistaken as to their 1;igbts, 
the compounding of a colorable clailn is permissible, . and the 
law will not inquire into the 1nerits of the original claim. 
As was said in 111ills v. Lee, 6 1vionroe 97, a settlement, 
whether "to pu.rchase peace" or for other reasons, is based 
on a valuable consideration, and ''the court will not inves-
tigate the· worth or a1nount of the different claims for the 
purpose of setting aside such co1npromise' '. See also B en·nett 
v. Prlline, 4 'Valls. 257; Cavode v. 111ckeloy, add. 56. 
In Braxton v. Hat-rison, 11 Grat. (52 Va.) 30, where the de-
fense of lack of consideration to a note was set up, the court 
said, p. 60: 
"There can be no doubt that the resolution of a colorable 
claim, conflicting· with that of another person, and the settle· 
ment of the dispute between the parties without suit, con. 
stitutes a good consideration; and in these eases, inequality 
of consideration does not, of itself, form any objection." 
!~1e court further said: ."But even if that liability (on the 
ongtnal controversy) had been doubtful, it was at least a sub-
ject of controversy in a pending suit at the tin1e the agree-
ment was entered into, and was a good consideration for a 
compromise,'' p. 60. 
In Zane v. Zane, 61\funf. (20 Va.) 406, it is said: 
''The consideration of compromising doubtful rights and 
settling boundaries, arc not only good, but favored in law.'' 
10 Supreme Court of· Appeals of Virginia 
Prof. lVIinor, 3 Inst~; Pt. 1, p. 133, in discussing the charac-
ter of consideration which will support a contract says, in 
part: "Postponing a demand or forbearance to enforce it for 
a time ~· * * compromising a colorable claim * * * are all in-
stances of valuable consideration,'' citing a wealth of au-
thority. And he adds that the promisor must be left to de-
termine for himself whether the value of the consideration 
shall induce him to make the promise. 
''.A compron1ise. of a controversy is a valuable considera-
tion to sustain a contract;'' R~tthM·ford v. Ruthe1'}ord, 55 W. 
ya. 56, 47 S. E. 240, citing both Za11w v. ZOJne, s~tpra, and 
1\tfinor, su,pra. 
''The prevention of litigation is not only a 'sufficient,· but 
it is a highly favored consideration, and no investigation into 
the character of the different claims surrendered will be in-
quired into, if the parties at the time thought there were 
doubtful questions between then1; '' Jarrett· v. Ludington,· 9 
W. Va. 333, 337, in ·which Za;ne·v. Zane, s~tpra, and Moo·re v. 
Fitzwater, 2 Rand. (23 Va.) 442, are cited. There is appended 
an elaborate note on the subjeet of compTomises to 1J1oo're v. 
Fitzwater, in Michie's .Annotated Reports. 
In Jarett v. Nickell, 4 W. Va. 276, the defendant owed the 
plaintiff $8,602.00 ''currency or money of the so-called Con-
federate States". Afterwards, he executed 8 bonds, including 
one of $642 in judg111ent, in lie11 of and to secure the same. 
In an action on the $6.42 bond, he filed a plea of no considera-
tion. The replication to this plea averred certain "disputes 
and difficulties'' existing between the parties, and that the 
bonds 'vere given in consideration of the compromise and set-
tlement. In overruling the trial court, the Supreme Court 
held the consideration to be both lawful and adequate. 
In 1J1ayor v. J~tdah, 5 Leigh (32 Va.) 305, 320, in eomparing 
judgments on issues, awards on arbitration, and private set-
tlement between the parties (each being a method of termi-
nating the controversy), the court cites, among other au-
thorities, Moore v. Fitzwa_ter, s~upra, and concludes: 
''So, where the parties have disputes. or differences, and 
they enter into a compromise, the compromise cannot be dis-
turbed, although it appear that it took place under a mistaken 
impression as to the law. For a party shall not be permitted 
to set aside a compromise, on the ground that the right was · 
on his side, since if this 'vere permitted, there would be no 
valid compron1ise, as on this principle one or the other would 
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always have the right to call it in question. * * * Every man 
who undertakes to act for himself upon his knowledge of the 
law in the settlement of his transactions, ought to be charged 
on his perils with a knowledge of the la,v." 
The syllabus thus states the law: ''Money paid under mis-
take or ignorance of fact, may be recovered back; otherwise 
if paid under a mistake or ignorance of law." To this case 
is appended quite a footnote on this topic. 
In Gates v. Shutts, 7 Mich. 127, Shutts charged Gates with 
burning his wheat, and threatened suit, and thereby secured 
from him a note for its value. The court held there was 
neither lack of consideration nor duress, "for a party may 
buy his peace in a case in which he knows there is no right 
against him. * ,:;. *' There would be no such thing as a compro-
mise or settlement of a dispute by the parties if the original 
controversy was not thereby closed.'' 
Certaintly this is all the defendants can claim: That they 
''purchased peace", knowing the facts. If so, there is the 
consideration. 
It is reiterated that there is no pretense of any misrepre-
sentation of any fact by plaintiffs. Nor can it be said that 
defendants, one of whom 'vas a graduate lawyer, relied on the 
statement of lVIr. Hooff, whom he knew was not a lawyer, for 
the law, since defendants took about three weeks to further 
consider the matter, with the most abundant opportunities for 
investigation of the law. 
Whether tested by the rule as stated in Skinner v. A1·m-
strong, 86 Va.1011, and sugg·ested in Southside Brick Wo'rks v. 
Anderson, 147 Va. 566, and Way v. Ba;ydest, 133 Va. 400, that 
if. the promise to answer fot the debt, etc., of another is in 
writing that is sufficient, or whether, as understood by the 
learned trial Judge a consideration as behveen promisor and 
promisee is necessary, in either event, the plaintiffs are en-
titled to recover the amounts sued for on the note, $885.20, 
with interest from October 16, 1937, and costs. 
It is a matter of tren1endous importance, especially to sub-
contractors, whether materia~ n1en or those furnishing labor, 
to know just ho'v precarious their situation may be. 
Whether, after having obtained from the owner not only a 
written, unconditional promise to pay tl1eir bills, but a nego-
. tiable promissory note, pursuant to that written promise, they 
may finally 1Je called on to meet the issue whether or not when 
the owner executed and delivered such note, unconditionally, 
the owner was then, or thereafter, in fact, indebted to the-
general contractor, and if so, in what sum. In fact, it is 
difficult to imagine any class of persons whose accounts are 
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closed with notes who are not acutely interested in a de-
termination of this issue. 
For the reasons aforesaid, your petitioners pray that a 
writ of error may be awarded to the said juclgn1ent complained 
of, that the sarne be reversed and annulled; and that this 
Court, on a hearing on such writ, proceed to enter such final 
judgment as the Circuit Court of Fairfax County ought to 
have entered, to-wit: Jndgn1ent for the plaintiffs against the 
defendants for the sun1 of $885.20 (being the aggregate of the 
principal sum in the note, and the attorney's fees therein pro-
vided), with interest thereon from October 1~, 1937, and their 
costs, on a note 'vaiving the hon1estead exen1ptim1. 
Should such writ be awarded, petitioners will adopt this pe-
tion as their opening brief. 
They would also like an opportunity of either stating orally 
their reasons for granting the writ, or of filing a reply brief, 
should defendants file a brief resisting the granting of the 
writ. 
A copy of this petition was mailed to Senator Frank L. 
Ball, counsel for defendants, at .Arlington, Virginia, July 1, 
1938. 
A. A. IIOOF AND ANNIE B. BROvVN, 
TRADING AS BROvVN AND HOO~,, 
By their Attornev. 
"ROBT. A. HUTCHISON, .. 
Manassas, Virginia, 
July 1st, 1938. 
) 
I, Robt. A. I-Iutchison, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my opinion 
it is proper that the judgment complained of in the foregoing 
petition should be reviewed by the said Court. 
July 1, 1938. 
ROBT. A. HUTCHISON, 
Received July 9, 1938. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk 
Sept: 9, 1938. Writ of m-ror awarded by the court. Bond, $500 .. 
~LB. vV. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Walter T. J\IIcCarthy, Judge 
of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. At a Cir-
cuit Court held for said County, at the Courthouse thereof, 
on Friday, the 8th day of April, 1938. 
lVIOTION FOR JUDGMENT. AT LAW NO. 1698. 
A. A. Hooff and .Annie B. Brown, trading as Brown and Hooff, 
Plaintiffs, 
versus 
Franklin Paine and Helen Paine, Defendants. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit, on the 30th day 
of December, 1937, came the Plaintiffs, by their Attorney, and 
filed in the Clerk's Office of said Court their notice of motion 
for judgment against the Defendants, returnable to the 17th 
day of January, 1938, tl1e same being in the words and figures 
following, to-wit: 
page 2 ~ To Franklin Paine and Helen Paine: 
Take notice, that on Monday, January 17th, 1938, that being 
· the first day of the January, 1938, term of the Circuit Court 
for Fairfax Coubty, Virginia, the undersigned, A. A. Hooff 
and Annie B. Brown, under the n_ame of Brown and Hooff, 
'vill move the sais Court for a judgment against you, and each 
of you for the sum of Eig·ht Hundred and Eighty Five Dollars 
and Twenty Cents ($885.20), with interest thereon from Octo-
ber 16, 1937, till paid, which sum is due us by you on a note, 
executed by you, for value, dated August 17, 1937, and pay-
able by you, to us, by name of "Brown and Hooff", at the 
Peoples National Bank of J\IIanassas, Virginia, sixty days 
after date, waiving the homestead, and providing for attor-
ney's fees of 15%. if not paid at maturity, in the principal 
sum of $769.70, which, with such attorney's fees, aggregates 
the sum o£ $885.20, which said note was not paid a.t maturity. 
The said note 'vas not in the hands of the undersigned the 
first day of any year, and therefore has not heretofore been 
assessable or taxable. 
The said note has not been paid; and the undersigned are 
/ 
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now entitled to the principal of said note, ·with interest and 
attorney's fees. 
Respectfully, 
A. A. I-IOOFF AND ANNIE B. BRO\VN, 
Trading as Brown and Hooff, 
By their Attorney. 
(Signed) ROBT. A. HUTCHISON, 
Robt. A. I-Iutc.hison. 
page 3 ~ PLEA OF THE GENERAL ISSUE IN BEHAL:B~ 
OF FRANI{LIN PAINE. 
The defendant, Franklin Paine, by his attorney, cmnes and 
says that he does not owe the sum of Eight Hundred Eighty, 
five and 20/100 Dollars ($885.20) in the declaration in this 
action den1andecl in 1nanner and form as the plaintiff hath . 
complained against him. And .of this the, said defendant puts 
himself upon the country. 
FRANK L. BALL, 




page 4 ~ PLEA OF THE GENERAL ISSUE IN BEHAL:B, 
OF HELEN PAINE. 
The defendant, Helen Paine, by her attorney, comes and says 
· that she does not owe the ·sum of Eight Hundred Eighty-five 
and 20/100 Dollars ($885.25) in the declaration in this action 
demanded in manner and form as the plaintiff hath com-
plained. against him. And of this the said defendant puts 
hitnself upon the country. 
FRANKL. BALL, 
Counsel for defendant. 
HELEN PAINE Defenda~t. 
By counsel. 
page 5 ~ And on the 8th day of April, 1938, the following 
order ·was entered by the Court, to-wit: 
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys, and 
the parties having waived a jury, the court tried the issue 
A. A. Hooff & A. B. Brown, etc v. F. Paine & H. Paine. 15 
on the replication by the plaintiffs to the defendants' pleas 
of nil debit, without a jury; 
And having heard the evidence, it is considered by the Court 
that the defendants do recover of the plaintiffs their costs in 
this their behalf expended, and that the plaintiffs go hence 
without day, to which ruling of the court the plaintiffs, by 
counsel, excepted. 
page 6 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTIONS. 
The following evidence on behalf of the plai.ntiffs and of the 
defendants, respectively, as hereinafter denoted, is all of the 
evidence that was introduced on the trial of this cause: 
The plaintiffs introduced the note sued on which is in the fol-
lowing words and figures, to-wit: ' 
"Manassas, Va. Aug. 17, 1937. 
Sixty days after elate we promise to pay 
to the order of Brown & Hooff Seven Hun-




Value received. Negotiable and payable at The Peoples 
National Bank of .Manassas, Va. The makers and endorsers 
of this note hereby waive presentment, demand, protest and 
notice of dishonor and hereby agr~e to remain bound for the 
payment of this note notwithstanding any extension or ex-
tensions of time of payment of it or any part of it made by 
agreement with any one or more parties hereto after maturity. 
The makers and endorsers of this note hereby waive the benefit 
of their homestead exemption as to this debt and agree to 
pay all expenses incurred in collecting the same, including 
fifteen per cent attorney's fees in case this note shall not be 
paid at n1aturity. 
FRANK·LIN PAINE, 
HELEN PAINE, 
Spring Field, Va. '' 
This cancels notes for $794.74 and $773.71, both dated Aug. 
3, 1937, as per agreement. , 
Endorsed: Brown & Hoo:ff. 
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page 7 ~ And the plaintiffs rested. 
The defendants to n1aintaln the issue on their part intro-
duced the defendant, Franklin Paine, who testified that about 
July 15, 1937, A. A. Hooff, one of the plaintiffs came to see 
him with reference to an unpaid bill of $794.7 4, due by NicDon-
ald, the general contractor, for 1naterials purchased by ~Ic­
Donald of plaintiffs, n1aterial men, to go into a house Mc-
Donald was building for the defend~nts by contract. 'rhat at 
that time the defendants, the house owners, were due ~IcDon­
ald about $289.00, to be paid ·when ~IcDonald co1npleted the 
furnace job. That Hooff told defendants his firm would file 
a n1echanic 's lien, and witness told hiin he did not wish a 
lien filed. Thereafter, August 4th, 1937, defendants wrote 
plaintiff as follows: 
Brown and Hooff, 
A1anassas, Virginia, 
Gentlemen: 
''August 4, 1937. 
Having been informed that the General Contractor, W. P. 
~1cDonell, who constructed my home on Lot 33, Leewood, still 
owes you a balance of $794.7 4 for the lumber and materials 
furnished by Brown and Hooff and since we desire to pre-
vent the filing of a lien, it is hereby agreed between Brown 
and :Hooff and Franklin and Helen Paine, husband and wife, 
Route One, Springfield, Virginia, that we will execute our note, 
due and payable in thirty days, for the balance now due of 
$794.7 4; that we agree to pay not less than $25.00 when the 
thirty days expire and that in consideration of this payn1ent 
you will extend the balance due for another thirty days upon 
the execution by us of another note due in thirty 
page 8 ~ days and that as future notes become due and and 
we make the regular $25.00 n1onthly payment, that 
you will grant an extension of thirty clays on cash note until 
the entire sum of $794.74 plus interest at six per cent shall 
have been paid; that in further consideration of this settle-
ment of your account by monthly paYJnents of not less than 
$25.00 we (n1yself and wife) agree to execute a second mort-
gage to Brown and Hooff at any time that Brown and Hooff 
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Plaintiffs did not require- defendants to execute the deed 
of trust or mortgage proffered. Defendants executed three 
notes. First designed to cover the amount of the plaintiffs bill, 
but error having been discovered a second note was executed 
and ·at the same time the note sued on dated on the expira-
tion of the first less a partial payment made. Before the third 
note became due, the witness consulted counsel and wrote 
plaintiffs as follo~s : 
Brown & Hooff, 
1\fanass~s, Virginia. 
Dear Sirs: , 
''August 26, 1937. 
I have been advised by a Virginia attorney that I am not 
obligated to any subcontractor unless I o've the general con-
tractor. I do not owe the general contractor any amount, 
and under those circumstances I demand the return of my 
note which was given without any consideration whatsoever. 
You are hereby notified that you are still within 
page 9 } the period. to file a lien and at liberty to do so. 
~fr. MacDonell has directed me not to make a 
settlement with any subcontractor, and states that he has just 
obtained a contract to build a store and aparbnent building 
at Barcroft, Virginia, on the Columbia Pike, just east of the 
tracks, which will amount to between $30;000 and $40,000 and 
that he will complete my house in the near future and pay 
all the bills that he owes. 
Truly yours, 
FRANKLIN R. PAINE. 
Route #1. 
Springfield, Virginia.'' 
That while there would have been $289.00 due McDonald 
had he completed the work, he failed to complete the work, 
and that when the notes were given, defendants did not owe 
McDonald anything, and owed him nothing thereafter. 
That at the time of the first conversation with Hooff on the 
premises about July 15th, he showed Hooff the job and told 
~hn that certain work 'vas yet to be completed and that when 
1t was ~ompleted he would owe McDonald $289.00, and as a 
matter of fact ~fcDonald ·failed to complete it and it cost the 
defendant more than $289.00 to complete the job. 
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That the witness ·was a graduate lawyer employed in one 
of the Governn1ent Departments as a law clerk. That the-
plaintiffs were not lawyers but material n1en. That Mr. Hooff, 
the only· men1ber of the plaintiff's firm 'vith whom the de-
fendants had any dealing, told him that he would file a me-
chanic's lien and that the defendant would have to 
page 10 ~ pay the bill and tlie defendant thought that he 
would be required under the law to pay the hill. 
And the court being of opinion that there was no considera-
tion to support any of the notes, gave judgement for the de-
fendants. 
Teste: This 3rd day of l\iay, 1938. 
(Signed) l"l ALTER T. 1\fcCARTI-IY, Judge. 
Received with notice to F. L. Ball, attorney for defendants 
May 3rd, 1938. 
(Signed) 'V ALTER T. l\ifcCARTI-IY, Judge. 
0. K. 
F. L. BALL, 
for defendants. 
page 11 ~ I, John ~L Whalen, Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County, .Virginia, do hereby certify that 
the foregoing· is a true and correct transcript of portions of 
the record in the case of A. A. Hooff and Annie B. Bro·wn, 
trading as Brown and Hooff, Plaintiffs, versu,s Franklin Paine 
and Helen Paine, Defendants, Motion· for Judgment, at Law 
No. 1698, as agreed upon and stipulated by counsel for the 
Plaintiffs and Defendants. 
I further certify that the notice required by Section 6339 of 
the Code of Virginia 'vas duly given counsel for the said De-
fendants and service thereof duly accepted by him. 
Given under my hand this lOth day of 1fay, 1938. 
(Seal) JOHN M. WHALEN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C . .C. 
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